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General overview
• Some defence of the objective reason view 
(ORV)
• Build on Fabienne Peter’s paper “From 
objective reason to public reason”
• Show that OVR can resist her arguments, 
attempt to pinpoint some problems of the 
public reason view (PRV) (without neglecting 
those of the ORV)
• Comparison between the two
Preliminaries
• The state of the debate and why I deeply 
appreciate Peter’s paper
• ORV: a problem of terminology
• Many similarities, one big difference
The public reason view
• Justificatory reasons are agreement-
dependent: the set of reasons all can accept, 
or that cannot be reasonably rejected
• Justification to: political authority must be 
justified to others
• Disagreements affect justification
• the justification of political authority is 
necessarily in terms of public reasons
The objective reason view
• Justificatory reasons are agreement-
independent: they do not depend on what 
people believe, think, desire, but are 
grounded in objective facts (realism)
• Justification simpliciter: since there are 
objective reasons, then justification is 
provided by those reasons
• Disagreements does not affect justification
• The justification of political authority is 
necessarily in terms of objective reasons
“From objective reason to public 
reason”
Peter’s aim: to reflect on the epistemology of 
practical reasoning, provide an account that is 
compatible with both view, and then show that, 
given that there are disagreements that are 
normatively significant, between the two views, 
we should pick the public reason one.
Peter’s target: the principle stating that the 
justification of political authority is necessarily in 
terms of objective reasons
First part of the argument
(1) There is something to be said about our 
perspective on facts: this is the point of view of 
practical reasoning > This is not a problem for 
objectivist.
(2) To be of interest, the objective reason view need 
to embrace the justified belief norm: you are 
allowed to use a reason p in practical reasoning iff
you are justified to believe that p > you might be 
mistaken about objective reasons, but you can still 
permissibly state what it is correct (from your point 
of view)
The argument from disagreement
If OR and PR theorists agree about (1) and (2), 
then permissible practical reasoning may result 
in disagreement and OR, by definition, rejects 
the idea that disagreement can normatively 
affect justification because of its independent-
whatever character
The argument from disagreement
“Practical disagreements that result from 
permissible reasoning affect justification in the 
following way. If you justifiably believe that p 
and I justifiably believe that not-p, an 
independent policy choice is either not justified 
to me or it is not justified to you”
So, Peter claims that there is gap between 
subjective and objective reasons and objective 
reasons must be reflected in someone’s 
subjective reasons.
Against the argument 1
But there is a problem with Peter’s 
characterization from ORV standpoint:
If you justifiably believe that p and I justifiably 
believe that not-p, one of the two options may 
be justified, despite of what we believe.
If we assume that p is true, and in the end we 
end up choosing the policy supported by p, then 
the policy is justified (as you believe)
Against the argument 2
The fact that a certain policy conforms to my set 
of beliefs does not say anything about its 
justification. Although I permissibly reason in a 
certain way, I may be wrong (and may be 
excused for reasoning so).
For the justification, the individual perspective 
just does not matter
This does not mean that it does not matter at 
all (precondition for action ≠ the reason itself)
The argument from necessity
Objective reasons are not necessary for practical 
justification > ORV has a big problem: we do not 
know which one of the reasons on the table (if 
any) is indeed objective.
What shall we do in case of peer disagreement, 
when the person who has the objective reason 
is unable to explain it to the other person?
We should choose the PRV.
A first response
But this is not argument that defeats ORV. 
Rather, it says that when confronted with peer 
disagreement, PRV scores better because it has 
a more workable epistemology.
But the ORV defender can still claim that 
agreement may just be great, but does not 
constitute justification: it is a problem of 
conflation (Cohen vs. Rawls)
It is an unsatisfactory answer if we stop here
Is ORV a real alternative?
What is ORV answer to peer disagreement?
It is not to find shared reasons, but go for a 
(principled) compromise 
1. Compromise ≠ correction or rectiﬁcation
2. Principled compromise ≠ strategic 
compromise > focus is on the reasons why the 
parties settle for a compromise
Epistemic and practical circumstances
EC: Epistemic approaches to peer disagreement 
diverge, but they all agree that peer disagreements 
are epistemically significant (focus of the debate: 
revision of belief ≠ justification)
PC: We cannot abstain from making a decision: 
disagreements cannot be just taken off the political 
agenda for political inaction necessarily turns into 
an action favoring the permissibility of certain 
behaviors some parties have reasons to forbid
Principled compromise
There are good reasons not to discard and 
dismiss the opinions of disagreeing peers
+
Disagreements at the political level require 
some settling (we do not have all the time in the 
world)
=
Principled compromise: recognition of epistemic 
parity; reasons are non-strategic
The problem of respect
Respect is the rationale of PRV: if we respect each 
other, we offer only public reason > justification 
simpliciter is dangerous because authoritarian, but 
is it?
Example: Bill believes the death penalty should be 
illegal, Jill disagrees. Bill does not say that the death 
penalty is wrong because he thinks so, but that 
death penalty is wrong because it is a draconian 
form of punishment, which treats barbarity with 
barbarity (as Bill believes)
Respect for rationality
Representing the OPR as authoritarian is a 
mischaracterization: requiring to provide reasons in 
objective terms is not letting people push others 
around, but asking to provide the true 
considerations (as they believe) to support a certain 
arrangement. 
Each and every citizen has to claim and defend 
those political measures for which they have 
reasons, given the epistemic circumstances they 
find themselves in, and that are able to persuade 
and convince others by appealing to their 
rationality
Public reason view and respect
3 problems:
(1) Exclusion from the legitimation pool
(2) Exchange of reasons
(3) Link between respect and public justification
Conclusions
Attempted to 
• show that ORV defenders can eschew Peter’s 
critiques
• to argue that ORV defenders have an 
alternative to PRV that is normatively 
interesting
• to claim that when it comes to the idea of 
respect, PRV may be more problematic than 
ORV
> More work needs to be done! 
